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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented by the appeal and 
cross appeal in this case: 
1. Did the District Court correctly rule that Stacey 
Properties was not entitled to accelerate the entire balance 
under a promissory note executed by Golwix Properties? 
2. Did the District Court fail to use the correct 
measure of damages in awarding relief to Golwix Properties for 
Stacey's breaches of warranty and breach of contract? 
3. Did the District Court err in failing to award 
Stacey its costs and attorney1s fees incurred in unsuccessfully 
attempting to collect the entire balance under a promissory note 
executed by Golwix Properties? 
4. Did the District Court err in failing to award 
Golwix Properties its costs and attorney's fees incurred in 
proving Stacey1s breaches of warranty and breach of contract? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by appellant Stacey Properties 
against respondents and cross appellants Ben Wixenf Francine 
Wixen, Bernie Goler, and Bonnie Goler ("Golwix Properties") 
alleging that appellant was entitled to accelerate the entire 
balance under a certain promissory note. Golwix Properties 
1. Respondents and cross appellants operate their real estate 
investment business under the name of Golwix Properties. For 
clarity and convenience, this brief will refer to respondents 
and cross appellants as "Golwix Properties" or simply 
"Golwix." 
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counterclaimed alleging offsets against payments due under the 
note for breaches of warranty and contract by Stacey Properties 
and additional cross respondent J. Ron Stacey. The District 
Court awarded damages to Golwix on some counterclaims based upon 
a percentage of the actual damages suffered. The damages awarded 
to Golwix exceeded the total of payments due under the note, but 
the District Court refused to award costs and attorney's fees to 
Golwix. Stacey does not challenge the damages awarded to Golwix, 
but seeks reversal of the District Court's ruling that the 
promissory note could not be accelerated. Golwix Properties has 
filed a cross appeal seeking a remand to the District Court with 
instructions to award Golwix Properties its actual damages 
incurred, together with its costs and attorney's fees as required 
by the agreements between the parties. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Golwix Properties disagrees with Stacey's statement of 
facts in many respects. Specificallyf Stacey has 
mischaracterized the District Court's ruling, has cited facts 
that are not supported by the record and which are not relevant 
to this appeal, has omitted certain of the most critical facts, 
and has referred to numerous allegations that have nothing to do 
with the issues before this court. Golwix Properties, therefore, 
makes the following statement of relevant facts. 
-2- \ 
On May 22, 1984, Golwix Properties entered into an 
2 
agreement (the "Agreement") with Stacey Properties and J. Ron 
Stacey to purchase certain commercial properties, including the 
Commonwealth Square Shopping Center in Sunset, Utah and the main 
U.S. Post Office building in Ogden, Utah, (Findings and 
3 
Conclusions 1| 1, R-496.) As partial payment for the 
properties, Golwix executed a promissory note (the "Note") on the 
same datef payable to Stacey Properties in monthly installments 
of $731.79, beginning on June 1, 1984. (.Id. 11 2f R-496.)4 
The Agreement provided important warranties and 
covenants concerning the quality of the properties purchased. 
Paragraph 1 of the Agreement provides as follows: 
[Stacey Properties and J. Ron Stacey] agree 
to remedy any latent defects in materials or 
workmanship which arise within a one year 
period from the date of closing. We 
represent and warrant to you that all 
heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and 
sewer systems at the properties are in 
working order and will be operative at 
closing. . . . We will perform all necessary 
repairs to the roof of the [Ogden] Post 
Office building which are reasonably required 
to maintain a watertight roof surface for a 
period of sixty-seven months from the date of 
closing at our sole cost and expense. 
2. The Agreement is included in the Addendum to this brief as 
Exhibit "A." 
3. The District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
are included in the Addendum to this brief as Exhibit "B." 
Citations to the record are given in the form of "R-" and the 
page number. For clarity, citations to the Transcript on 
Appeal are distinguished by the designation "TR-" and the 
page number. 
4. The Note is included in the Addendum as Exhibit "C." 
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(Id. K 8, R-498.) The terms of the Note provided protection to 
Goiwix Properties that the warranties and covenants contained in 
the Agreement would in fact be performed. Goiwix expressly 
retained important offset rights to ensure Stacey's performance. 
(16. 11 4, R-496-97.) 
Shortly after Goiwix Properties took possession of the 
propertiesr a large air-conditioning unit at the Ogden post 
office was found to be inoperable. (JD3. fl1| ll.a(l) & (4)f 
R-499.) Goiwix incurred a total expense of $22,758 to replace 
the air-conditioning unit. (J[d. <[ ll.a(5), R-499.) 
Goiwix Properties made the first two payments under the 
Note. (id. 1[ 3, R-496).5 On September 5, 1984, Goiwix 
Properties invoked its offset rights under the Note by notifying 
Stacey that the amount expended to replace the post office air 
conditioner would be offset against payments due or to become due 
under the Note. (_Id. 1[ 5f R-497). Stacey responded on September 
12f 1984, by letter, stating that it was accelerating the entire 
balance under the Note because Goiwix Properties had failed to 
5. Stacey appears to make some issue of the timeliness of the 
initial two payments under the Note. See Appellant's opening 
brief at 2. However, the District Court found that Stacey 
accepted the first two payments and further concluded that 
Goiwix was not in default at the time the complaint was 
filed. (Findings and Conclusions 1Mf 3r 14 f & 15, R-496, 
505-06.) Indeed, the evidence presented at trial 
demonstrated that there was some confusion concerning when 
the initial payments were due and the parties entered into an 
agreement to resolve the confusion. (TR-77-79; Exhibit D-6.) 
Stacey's reference to the initial payments is therefore 
completely irrelevant to this appeal. 
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make the September 1984 payment. (_Id. U 7, R-497.) Stacey then 
filed a complaint commencing this action. 
Golwix Properties filed counterclaims against Stacey 
alleging breaches of the warranties and covenants contained in 
the Agreement and requesting the District Court to offset all 
amounts awarded against payments due or to become due under the 
Note. (IcL 11 9, R-498.) Further, Golwix provided Stacey with 
written notice of each of the items claimed as offsets, including 
the amounts of and reasons for the claims, as required by the 
terms of the Note. (1(3. 1[ 10, R-498.) 
The case did not come to trial until May 28f 1986, and 
was tried before Judge David E. Roth without a jury. The 
counterclaims that are pertinent to this appeal involved repairs 
performed by Golwix to a defective sewer at the Commonwealth 
Square property; replacement of the Ogden post office air 
conditioner; and Stacey1s failure to maintain the Ogden post 
office roof in a watertight condition as required by the terms of 
the Agreement. 
Commonwealth Sewer. The District Court agreed with the 
evidence and awarded Golwix Properties the amount of $1,037.83 
for repairs performed to a defective sewer at the Commonwealth 
Square property. (Id. «M| 11.b & 13.b, R-499-500, 503.) Judge 
Roth found that the defect was covered by the terms of the 
warranty contained in Paragraph 1 of the Agreement. (Id.) 
Air-Conditioning Unit. Based on the evidence, the 
District Court found that the air-conditioning unit at the Ogden 
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post office was not in working order and operative on May 22, 
1984 in breach of the terms of the Agreement. (_Ld. % 13.a(l), 
R-502.) The court further found that Stacey had failed to make 
repairs to the unit after being notified that the unit was 
inoperablef (jxL K ll.a(4)f R-499), and that Golwix Properties 
incurred an expense of $22
 f 758 to replace the unitf {id_. <[ 
ll.a(5) , R-499.) 
The evidence presented at trial indicated that soon 
after the closing of the purchase of the properties, Golwix was 
notified of the air conditioner problem. Golwix quickly 
responded to the problem by sending the Holbrook Company, a 
heating and air-conditioning contractor, to investigate the 
problem. (TR-170-71.) On June 22, 1984, a Holbrook technician 
inspected the unit and attempted repairs. (TR-171-76.) Those 
repairs were unsuccessful because repeated leaks in the condenser 
coil over the years had resulted in serious damage to the 
compressor unit and other parts of the system. (TR-208-10.) The 
leaks in the coil were ultimately caused by a design defect in 
the plating to which the coil was attached. Excessive vibrations 
of the plating had caused the coil to leak repeatedly. (TR-210, 
224-25.) Bob Banford, an air-conditioning expert from the 
Holbrook Company testified that he investigated the costs of 
repairing the unit to make it operative and estimated such cost 
to be $19,000 to $20,000. (TR-211.) Because the repair cost 
nearly equaled the cost of a new unit, the Holbrook Company 
recommended that the unit be replaced. (TR-211-12.) Mr. 
-6-
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Banford's unrebutted testimony indicated that replacement was the 
most reasonable and prudent course of action given the cost of 
repair versus replacement. (TR-215.) Consequently, Golwix 
reasonably incurred the actual cost of $22,750 to replace the 
unit. (Findings and Conclusions 1[ ll.a(5), R-499.) The Trial 
Court, however, only awarded damages in the amount of $5,689.50 
with respect to the air conditioner, reasoning that "the unit 
would have had approximately 25% of its useful life remaining 
under normal conditions". (16. % ll.a(3), R-499.)6 
Post Office Roof. The District Court concluded that 
Stacey failed to perform all necessary repairs which were 
reasonably required to maintain the Ogden post office roof in a 
watertight condition in breach of the terms of the Agreement. 
(Id. 1j 13.c(l), R-503.) Golwix presented evidence at trial that 
the roof had leaked incessantly since the time that Golwix 
purchased the property and that it would continue to do so 
throughout the remainder of the contract period due to its 
deteriorated state. (TR-120-29, 159-60, 279-80, 284-94, Exhibit 
D-23.) Golwix sought damages in the amount of $43,750, which was 
the cost of replacing the roof. (Findings and Conclusions <I 
9(c), R-498.) Judge Roth concluded that Golwix was only entitled 
to 25% of the cost of replacing the roof and awarded Golwix the 
6. The only shread of an evidentiary basis for the court's 
finding was Mr. Banford's testimony that the normal life of 
such air-conditioning units is "ten to fifteen years" 
depending on how well the unit is maintained and that this 
particular unit had been installed in 1976. (TR-216.) 
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sum of $12,250. (Jd. <f 13.c(3), R-503-04.) The justification 
given for such a partial award was to avoid giving a "windfall" 
to Golwix. (JEd. 1[ 13.c(2), R-503.) Stacey was relieved of any 
further obligation to repair or maintain the roof. (Jxi. 1M( 
13c.(5)f R-504.) 
In sum, the trial court awarded the following damages 
to Golwix on its counterclaims: 
Commonwealth Sewer Repair $ lf037.83 
Ogden Post Office Air Conditioner $ 5f377.00 
Ogden Post Office Roof $12 ,250.00 
TOTAL $18,664.83 
Subtracting from that total an award made to Stacey of $958.12 on 
7 
a claim concerning a property tax refund, Golwix was given a 
net award, exclusive of interest, in the amount of $17,706.71. 
At the time of trial, the total of the unpaid installments under 
the Note was $16,099.38. (_Id. if 6, R-497.) 
The District Court distinguished between the types of 
damages awarded in its ruling. The amounts awarded with respect 
to the sewer and the air conditioner were considered to be 
"offset" items because Golwix had already incurred the 
out-of-pocket expense. (Id. 1h( 13.a(3), 13.b(2), R-502-03.) The 
amount awarded for Stacey1s breach of the Agreement with respect 
to the post office roof, however, was characterized as an award 
of damages because Golwix had not yet paid for the new roof. 
7. The parties disputed a property tax proration that was not 
performed to adjust for actual taxes paid during the year of 
the transaction. Neither party has appealed the District 
Court's ruling on this issue and the issue is not before this 
court. 
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(id. II 13.c(4), R-504.) Nevertheless, Judge Roth recognized that 
there is no practical distinction between the damages awarded and 
refused to accelerate the Note. (Id. 11 17
 f R-506.) The 
complaint was therefore dismissed for no cause of action. 
o 
(Judgment % 4.) 
The District Court refused to consider the application 
for costs and attorney's fees by any party. Stacey was denied 
costs and fees because it did not prevail on its complaint. 
(Findings and Conclusions % 20, R-506.) The court concluded that 
Golwix "would be entitled to an award of attorney's fees if [it] 
had simply defended the case successfully, but [is] not entitled 
to an award of fees because [it] did not prevail on many of its 
counterclaims". (J[d. 1! 21, R-506.) 
SUMMAR.Y OF ARGUMENT 
A. Acceleration. 
The District Court correctly ruled that Stacey was not 
entitled to accelerate the entire balance under the Note. The 
total of the damages awarded to Golwix Properties plainly 
exceeded the total of payments due under the Note at the time of 
trial. Even the selected authorities cited in Stacey's opening 
brief mandate the conclusion that acceleration is not permitted 
under such circumstances. 
Stacey focuses on the District Court's characterization 
of the damages awarded to Golwix as the sole support for its 
8. A copy of the Judgment is included in the Addendum as Exhibit 
"D." 
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argument in favor of acceleration. Stacey asserts that Golwix' 
primary recovery (for Stacey1s breach of contract to maintain the 
post office roof) should be completely ignored in analyzing the 
acceleration issue. The tortured analysis relied upon by Stacey 
should be rejected. The distinction between amounts previously 
expended and amounts that will be required to be expended as a 
result of contract breaches is artificial and is not supported by 
law. Because Golwix1 counterclaims arose from the same 
transaction as the Note, Golwix1 right of recovery is properly 
classified as recoupment. It is uniformly held that recoupment 
is allowed to defeat a plaintiff's action regardless of whether 
the damages awarded are liquidated or unliquidated. Moreover, 
the express terms of the Note and Agreement require that the 
entire amount awarded to Golwix be considered in determining the 
availability of acceleration. 
The District Court correctly denied acceleration on 
various other grounds. First, case law dictates that 
acceleration should be measured at the time of the attempted 
acceleration. Golwix was not delinquent in making any payments 
when Stacey declared acceleration and filed its complaint. 
Second, Judge Roth recognized that equitable considerations would 
not permit acceleration under the circumstances in this case. 
Acceleration is a harsh remedy that should not be dependent upon 
the uncertainties and delays in bringing this case to trial which 
permitted a substantial amount of unpaid installments to 
accumulate before the case could even be heard. Finally, Judge 
-10-
Roth ruled that acceleration would be inappropriate because 
Golwix had been awarded a money judgment for Stacey1s breach of 
contract, which when combined with the other damages awardedf 
exceeded the cumulative unpaid installments. This court should 
affirm the District Court's refusal to permit acceleration. 
B
* Measujre of Damages. 
The District Court applied an incorrect measure of 
damages with respect to Stacey's breaches of warranty and 
contract. The court only awarded to Golwix a percentage of the 
actual damages proven for replacement of the air-conditioning 
unit and for breach of the agreement to maintain the post office 
roof. Golwix was entitled to an award of damages equal to the 
actual damages suffered since such damages were foreseeable and 
reasonably within the contemplation of the parties at the time 
they entered into the Agreement. 
C. Attorney's Fees. 
This Court has consistently ruled that attorney's fees 
are recoverable only where there is a specific statutory or 
contractual basis for the award. The Note provides for recovery 
of attorney's fees "incurred by or in connection with the 
enforcement or performance of any of the rights of [Stacey] 
hereunder. . . . " The attempted acceleration of the Note by 
Stacey was improper in the face of the damages awarded to Golwix 
on its counterclaims. Hencef Stacey is not entitled to any award 
of fees since no fees were incurred in the enforcement or 
performance of any right Stacey had under the Note. 
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Golwix, howeverf is entitled to an award of costs and 
attorney's fees incurred in connection with the counterclaims on 
which it prevailed. In Paragraph 17 of the Agreement, Stacey 
agreed to pay all costs and attorney's fees incurred by Golwix in 
" [t]he enforcement of your rights under this agreement." The 
District Court incorrectly concluded that it was necessary for 
Golwix to prevail on all of its counterclaims to qualify for an 
award of attorney's fees. The law as explained by the Utah 
Supreme Court requires an award of costs and attorney's fees with 
respect to those claims successfully proven by Golwix. 
ARGUMENT 
1
• THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT STACEY WAS NOT 
ENTITLED TO ACCELERATE THE ENTIRE BALANCE UNDER_THE NOTE IN 
LIGHT OF THE_ AMOUNTS AWARDED UNDER THE COUNTERCLAIMS. 
A
* Acceleration Cannot be Permitted Where The Total 
Damages Awarded on the _Cqunterclaims Exceeded the 
Cumijlatiye Installments. 
Stacey first contends that the District Court 
erred in determining that there was no right to accelerate the 
Note because at the time of trial proven "offsets" were less than 
the cumulative installments. That argument is misleading, 
ignores the law cited in the very cases relied upon by Stacey, 
and is contrary to the law of offset and recoupment. 
The most glaring fault in Stacey's analysis is 
that it attempts to ignore or explain away the bulk of the award 
recovered by Golwix on its counterclaims. A review of the record 
-12-
reveals that the total damages awarded on the counterclaims 
exceeded the cumulative installments under the Note at the time 
of trial. The net amount awarded to Golwix was $17,706.71, 
whereas the total cumulative installments under the Note was 
$16 ,099.38.9 
The case law cited by Stacey compels the 
conclusion that acceleration would be improper. The case most 
heavily relied upon by Stacey is Canton_Hardware v. Holler, 53 
N.E.2d 509 (Ohio 1944). In Canton Hardware the defendant 
purchased equipment from the plaintiff and executed a promissory 
note for a portion of the purchase price. The defendant made the 
first four payments under the note but did not make the fifth 
payment, claiming that there had been a breach of warranty. At 
the time of trial, the damages awarded to the defendent for 
breach of warranty were less than the matured installments. The 
appellate court upheld the trial court's decision to allow 
acceleration under such facts, concluding as follows: 
In the opinion of this court, since the 
defendant's damages which he sought to have 
applied on the note were found to be less 
than the current installments due, the 
plaintiff, as a matter of fact, was not 
liable to defendant and therefore could 
enforce the note, including the acceleration 
clause, according to its terms. 
Id. at 512 (emphasis added). 
9. The comparison cited in the text is even generous in favor of 
Stacey. The $17,706.71 figure does not include prejudgment 
interest awarded to Golwix on its counterclaims and adjusts 
for an amount of property tax reimbursement which the 
District Court concluded was due to Stacey. 
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In other wordsf the Canton Hardware court 
compared the total amount of damages awarded to the defendant 
against the cumulative installments due under the note. Because 
the plaintiff was found not to be liable to the defendant for any 
amount in excess of the cumulative installments, the court 
concluded that acceleration was proper. Implicit in that 
holding, however, is that acceleration would have been improper 
if the defendant's damages exceeded the past due installments. 
That is precisely what occurred in this action. The damages 
awarded to Golwix exceeded the cumulative installments due under 
the Note. Accordingly, Judge Roth properly ruled that 
acceleration was improper. 
Stacey attempts to justify its acceleration 
argument by distinguishing between the nature of the damages 
awarded to Golwix. Stacey contends that the damages with respect 
to its breach of the contract to maintain the post office roof 
were not a proper subject of offset because Golwix had not 
incurred any out-of-pocket expense with respect to the roof as of 
10. Stacey also relies upon two cases cited by the Canton 
Hardware court. Neither case, however, is on point. See 
Haines v. Commercial Mortgage Co., 255 P. 802 (Cal. 1927) 
(case deals with California usury law and does not address 
the question of acceleration); Battlecreek Bread Wrapping 
Mach. Co. v. Paramount Baking Co., 88 Utah 67/39 P.2d 323 
(Utah 1934) (case holds that evidence should have been 
allowed to prove a lien against a machine sought to be 
replevied but does not address the issue of acceleration). 
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the time of trial. Such a distinction, however, is 
meaningless. The only distinction between the damage awards, at 
best, may be that the roof damages were unliquidated prior to 
trial. The law of setoff and recoupment is clear, however, that 
liquidated and unliquidated damages may be relied upon to defeat 
a plaintiff1s claim where the damages arise from the same 
transaction. 
Applying the term "offset" to the damages awarded 
to Golwix is inaccurate. The counterclaims of Golwix are more 
correctly characterized as sounding in recoupment. The 
distinction between offset and recoupment is well established: 
. . . Recoupment is confined to matters 
arising out of and connected with the 
transaction upon which the action is brought. 
• • . . 
"Set-off" is not synonymous with 
recoupment only in that it is a "money demand 
by the defendant against the plaintiff 
arising upon contract and constituting a debt 
i^^E^Jl^.?.^ _of _^ _nd unconnected__v/iUi the cause 
of _act icJn _sej: _fo rt h_ in the com plaint. . . ." 
Jewell v. Compton, 277 Or. 93, 559 P.2d 874, 875 (1977) (quoting 
11. Stacey refers to a statement made at trial by counsel for 
Golwix as support for this distinction. See Stacey1s opening 
brief at 12n.4. The statement referenced, however, is not 
accurately reflected and is taken out of context. Counsel 
for Golwix strongly disagrees that any distinction should be 
made between the damages awarded in determining the issue of 
acceleration. The statements referenced by Stacey were not 
made in the context of addressing the issue of acceleration. 
Moreover, counsel for Golwix argued that the damages for the 
post office roof "can be treated as offsets and credits" 
against the Note and the result of analyzing such amounts as 
an offset or damages would be the same. (TR-576.) 
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Rogue River Management Co. v. Shaw, 243 Or. 54, 58-59, 411 P.2d 
440, 442 (1966) (emphasis in original); see generally 20 Am. Jur. 
2d, Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff §§ 1, 2 (1965) 
(describing the distinction in terminology). 
In this case, the Agreement and the Note were 
executed concurrently in connection with the same real estate 
transaction. The Note was given as partial consideration for the 
properties purchased and sold pursuant to the Agreement. 
Moreover, the Note itself expressly references Paragraph 17 of 
the Agreement in describing Golwix1 rights to "offset" certain 
amounts against payments under the Note. 
The Utah Supreme Court has expressly held that 
recoupment is always present as an equitable right regardless of 
whatever language may be contained in an agreement. In Freston 
v. Gulf Oil Co., 565 P.2d 787 (Utah 1977), this court stated: "In 
the absence of a showing of prejudice, equity requires a right of 
recoupment." _Id. at 788. Consequently, Golwix had the right to 
recoup amounts owing to it by virtue of the Agreement, whether or 
not it had expressly retained such right in the Note. 
There are certain important differences between 
the treatment of recoupment and offset claims. Significantly for 
purposes of this case, recoupment permits that both liquidated 
and unliquidated damages may be used to defeat a plaintiff's 
claim. This well established principle has been stated as 
follows: 
Although unliquidated damages cannot 
ordinarily be the subject of setoff, it is 
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well settled that a total or partial failure 
of consideration immediately connected with 
the cause of action or any equitable defense 
arising out of the same transaction may be 
allowed mitigation of damages or recoupment, 
not strictly by way of setoff, but for the 
purpose of defeating the plaintiff's action 
in whole or in part and to avoid circuity of 
action. In short, unliquidated damages may 
be recouped or used in recoupment where they 
arise out of the contract or transaction on 
which the plaintiff's action is based, but 
not where they arise out of a separate 
transaction. It has been stated broadly that 
recoupment has no regard to whether the claim 
is liquidated or unliquidated. 
20 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, at 280 (emphasis added); see, e.g., 
Pacific Concrete Federal Credit Union v.Kauanoe, 614 P.2d 936, 
939 (1980). 
I n
 Gibbons v. Kosuga, 121 N.J.Super. 25 2, 258, 
296 A.2d 557, 560-61 (1972), the court stated the policy 
justification for treating recoupment differently than setoff: 
The fact that recoupment seeks the reduction 
of a claim because of an offsetting claim 
arising out of exactly the same transaction 
would seem in logic and in equity to justify 
treating it differently than a setoff which 
seeks a reduction because of an offsetting 
claim arising out of a totally unrelated 
transaction. To hold differently would be to 
permit the inequity of one party to a 
transaction demanding full performance from 
the other while refusing to perform fully 
itself. 
For all of the reasons stated in the authorities 
cited above, there is simply no justification for treating 
differently the types of damages awarded to Golwix. The fact 
remains that the total damages awarded to Golwix exceeded the 
cumulative installments under the Note at the time of trial. As 
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stated by the Gibbons court, to hold differently would permit the 
inequity of Stacey demanding full performance under the Note 
while at the same time refusing to perform fully its obligations 
under the related Agreement. Such a result is contrary to law 
and all principles of equity. Stacey1s argument for acceleration 
must therefore be rejected. 
B
• The Express Language of the Note_and Agreement 
Preclude Acceleration. 
In addition to the rights of recoupment generally 
available under the case lawf Golwix expressly reserved such 
rights by language placed in the Note. Stacey focuses upon a 
single word contained in the Note to justify its argument that 
Golwix was not entitled to a credit against Note payments for 
damages awarded with respect to the post office roof. Stacey 
contends that the term "offset" was given a technical meaning 
under the Note and was limited to certain "reimbursable items." 
See Stacey1s opening brief at 12. Stacey goes on to cite 
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary as its sole authority for its 
argument concerning the correct interpretation of the language of 
the Note. The narrow construction urged by Stacey is contrary to 
well established principles of law and rules of construction. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that 
"acceleration clauses in negotiable instruments and other 
contracts will be enforced in accordance with the agreement of 
the parties". KIXXf Inc. v. Stallion Music, Inc., 610 P.2d 1385, 
1388 (Utah 1980). In construing the meaning of the terms of the 
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Note and Agreement, the court must look to the language of the 
agreements as a whole and not isolated portions of the language 
as proposed by Stacey. See, e ^ ^ Larrabee v. Royal Dairy 
Products, 614 P.2d 160 (Utah 1980). Because acceleration is a 
harsh remedy that is not favored by the courts, see, e.g., 
Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Utah 1976), courts 
have uniformly held that a construction of the language of a note 
which would prevent acceleration is favored over a contrary 
construction, See, e.^, Ramp v. English, 500 S.W.2d 461, 463 
(Tex. 1973) ("if there is reasonable doubt as to the meaning of 
the terms employed, preference should be given to that 
construction which will avoid the forfeiture and prevent 
acceleration of the maturity of the debt"). Finally, this court 
is not bound by any construction of the agreements that was made 
by the District Court. See, e.g. , Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 
P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986) (interpretation of a contract is a 
question of law on which no deference needs to be given to the 
trial court). 
In light of the foregoing principles of 
construction, the language contained in the Note and the 
Agreement do not permit acceleration under the circumstances in 
this case. In entering into the Note, Golwix retained important 
rights to secure Stacey's performance under the Agreement. The 
relevant language of the Note provides: 
Contemporaneous with Maker's, execution of 
this note, Makers, [Stacey] Properties and J. 
Ron Stacey ("Stacey") have executed a letter 
agreement relating to the sale and purchase 
-19-
of certain parcels or realty. . . . Pursuant 
to Section 17 of said letter agreement, 
[Stacey] Properties and Stacey agree to 
indemnify, defend and hold Makers harmless 
and to reimburse Makers on demand from and 
against, for, and with respect to, inter 
alia, any claim, liability or obligation 
relating or attributable to any breach or 
failure of any representation or warranty 
given by [Stacey] Properties and Stacey 
contained in the letter agreement . . . or 
any failure of any of them to perform any 
covenant to be performed under such 
agreement. . . . Makers shall have the right 
to offset against any amounts due or to 
become due to [Stacey] Properties under this 
note any such reimbursement due to Makers 
under Section 17 of said letter agreement 
(Findings and Conclusions «| 4, R-496-97.) Paragraph 17 of the 
Agreement, which is referenced in the Note, provides as follows: 
We agree to indemnify, defend and hold you 
harmless and reimburse you on demand from and 
against, for, and with respect to any claim, 
liability, obligation, loss, damage, 
deficiency, assessment, judgment, cost or 
expense (including without limitation 
reasonable attorney's fees and expenses) 
. . . action, suit, proceeding or demand, of 
any kind or character, arising out of or in 
any manner incident, relating or attributable 
to: 
a. any breach or failure of any 
representation or warranty given by us 
contained in this agreement . . .; 
b. any failure of either of us to 
perform or observe, or to have performed or 
observed, in full, any covenant, agreement or 
condition to be performed or observed by us 
under this agreement . . .; 
• • • • 
d. the enforcement of your rights 
under this Agreement. 
(Agreement H 17.) 
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language contained in Paragraph 17 of the Agreement and the 
related section of the Note, It is axiomatic that one does not 
have to incur out-of-pocket expenses to have suffered damages for 
breach of a contract. Frequently, a party who has suffered a 
loss seeks compensation by way of damages to obtain funds to 
rectify the loss. By referencing Paragraph 17 of the Agreement 
in the terms of the Note, and broadly defining the 
indemnification obligations of Stacey, the parties clearly 
expressed their intent to provide a mechanism for Golwix to be 
made whole with respect to any type of loss suffered by reason of 
Stacey1s breach of any of the terms of the Agreement. Any other 
construction would render useless the right retained by Golwix to 
offset the types of loss or damage enumerated in Section 17 
against Note payments. 
A construction permitting the offset of all types 
of damages is also consistent with analogous law under the 
Uniform Commercial Code. Section 2-717 of the UCC provides that 
a buyer "may deduct all or any part of the damages resulting from 
any breach of the contract from any part of the price still due 
under the same contract." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-717 (1980). 
The types of damages that may be deducted are in no way 
distinguished based upon whether the buyer has incurred 
out-of-pocket expenses with respect to the amount to be offset. 
The case law interpreting this section of the UCC makes clear 
that all types of damages resulting from a breach of a sales 
agreement may be offset against any amounts owed. See, e^g^r 
-22- ( 
o t ., i r t ; d h ' 
•J < J i . J J or. e d c n 
n i 1 i r r ? i * •,t * i 
wen 11 ; ,1 stM.ui 1 *vr. -, • • n 
, . . amages ; •> n*' 
p i kup fj a r - pt-r-ju i f t *->d a s 
i • x 
- o i - p o c k e t e x p e n s e i s 
Vv < . • U 
I 1 s e t wht.a • r ) 1 L/* u ' -
, a .- ^ , S f a c e y ' p con- -a . . - a. Liiu 
r ^ ' i !b ' jrseai"v ' ' mit - r * J-;*-- it--pock*-i e x p e n s e s ch • i tem: - t'<** 
w • s e t i::i gl it s i ; "; • i * 
Th« w j f d r r • A g r e e m e n t s p e c i t: l ca i I y e i c i i U ' 1 Ltiai in -w xcd o f 
d a i i ' . ^ s i s a 4 " " ' r " i m b , ] ' ' f , ' ' T ^ ^ " 1 n - ^ u i a be o f f s c L . 
S t r . c e > ' s argui iu . •- . . . i j i -iv :JL
 t <:j <.*'.* o . 
^ 3 i l i t ^ k L e „ ^ o n s i d e r a t^io n s _P r e c L ud_e Ac c e le^ra 11 on 
Jftv. j I L W J _ - _ O O SI > J L : w i t , , I . L U V ' U ' 4 i <• i.Lciil^ O l ydlfldge 
Awarded to _Golwix . 
Regardless of how the i •-HIS of aamage are 
character^ . -t ca a i\ .-. • i • •:• MV..> • M> r .= - • - •- - -,. -
l
.h- Note under t. he circumstances c. ; -
 saqo F i* a s-
:• urai HIS uecisie- f -^
uusoiib SLJJ '-^  . i a ,,,^ a Fact and Conclu./.u'i.; ,av 
'The 'la i-i! -• -a. • refused to decelerate ta --a r( 
•afi'MiJii O' iri- *. isure; . 
n"- d e f av ! f ; < 1 - - . . ^ i i > • 
i I-lt .' i M n ' .J- . ^ a a t . e a a C C u i a r : i ' ) ' 1 , - a " 
1 i , 
because the payments made by GoJ wi: 
1
 "; case; ( /') st-acey was 
p i i l l ) ! 
?place the .J i -
conditioner exceeded the amounts due under the Note on that date; 
(3) Acceleration is a harsh remedy and should not be dependent 
upon the uncertainties of delays in bringing a case to trial 
where there was no default when the action was initiated; and (4) 
Acceleration was inappropriate at the time of trial because the 
total damages awarded exceeded the cumulative installments at the 
time of trial. (See Findings and Conclusions 1M( 14-17, 
R-505-06.) 
Judge Roth's reasoning is well supported. 
Acceleration is a harsh remedy which is disfavored under Utah 
law. In Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1976), a case 
relied upon by Stacey, this court stated: 
The clause which allows for acceleration in 
case of default, if strictly enforced, is a 
severe covenant, the invocation of which has 
similarity to other forfeitures. The 
imposition of such severe conditions is not 
favored in the law . . . . 
Id. at 1147. In reaching this conclusion, the Williamson court 
cited Section 1-208 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, which 
provides that a holder may exercise the option to accelerate 
"only if he in good faith believes that the prospect of payment 
or performance is impaired." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-208 (1980). 
Consequently, the harsh remedy of acceleration should not be 
allowed where there was no default at the time that acceleration 
was attempted. It would work an unconscionable and inequitable 
result to make acceleration dependent upon the uncertainty of 
delay in bringing a case to trial, particularly where damages are 
-24- ( 
awarded at trial whi-.'t exceed t ru* toti: -MsLallraents that accrued 
i t i i! h i • i 1 1 1 (* i i 111
 f 
.uor ^ase o 
:'ih'* 
a c p v f tV- L i b \ . ' ^UL-
•lpoar- ' ecoqn i /• T *i; 
> p ' 
-i f 
^ n s n i ^ r p f i r^ , n h \ s t l ( v 
^P 
So. -'a 
i- -^:.r„Li:: < 
justifying .ioeeLerat^ -
at" 'MTipt.ed ac"." ^ 1 ^ ratiuii, 
whe: ner -;; - - - prpvp] 
and .--one] ad. *<i •; 
Because the $7,350 offset wo.- • ,t * 
liquidated sum to which Wells .mi Crippen 
• 'were immediately entitled, they were not in 
• default on the promissory note when Cobb 
a11empted to acc e1erat e the debt, so Cobb's 
exercise ofT his option to accelerate was not 
• p roper . 
.: \0hc' nphasi , added' ">~ten "t ae^-s attempted to r-xerr ;of 
•
 !
 n .- • ^ - ' r* ' s • * ^  i • ^r\ ^ v uake 
t ii- payuu at ' t i(« , ..,',_-<.; ,. , 
] ^ ^ J . The o f f s e t c l - i lined -\ i * >r v ' t jpl ac' jm- ' • he 
1 
con..: [ uned t < 
co "*1- ^ f e ^ ' 
r t - J . . ; e d i a c t u a i •, <J . r 
)t p r t ,-$ H e h t o r aq J • n s t 
, v ,: ^ , ^P 
" i* ju ; i -, <JD1 e 
See, e . g . , S£ay_v. Davis f 
(1969 a LUULL o l <=4uiL:, 
inpqu* a-»l^ acce l e r a t i on
 ( 
Carmichael v. Rice, 4? 
" ^ / • < - - f t * H ^ ^ h o * - f r n n i
 i l 4 
• * * ' - - ' - f 
• -. . < . •)<; . 1 9 4 " . ' 
an 
- 2 5 -
acceleration clause which will work a great hardship on the 
debtor.") 
The cases relied upon by Stacey in support of its 
argument that the question of default should be measured at the 
time that judgment is finally rendered are inapplicable under the 
facts in this case. For example, in Canton Hardware Co. v. 
Holler, 53 N.E. 2d 509 (Ohio 1944), the court concluded that the 
debtor should have instituted a separate action to recoup damages 
for breach of warranty and at the same time continued making 
payments on a note to prevent the risk of acceleration. However, 
there is no indication from the Canton Hardware decision that the 
note at issue in that case contained specific language providing 
a procedure for claiming offsets. The decision would imply that 
where the parties have agreed to a procedure for asserting 
offsets, a separate legal action need not be instituted to claim 
the offsets. The Note in this case provides such a specific 
nonjudicial procedure and Golwix properly invoked that procedure 
by notifying Stacey of the specific amounts and reasons for the 
claimed offsets. 
Stacey argues that this line of reasoning creates 
an inconsistency between the offset provision and the 
acceleration provision in the Note and that Judge Roth's 
conclusion runs contrary to public policy. According to Stacey, 
determining default at the time of acceleration would unfairly 
require a note holder to declare acceleration at the moment when 
"legitimate" offset claims were exceeded by the amount in default 1 
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the Note and acceleration was inappropriate. This court should 
therefore affirm Judge Roth's conclusion on this issue. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE CORRECT MEASURE OF 
DAMAGES. 
The District Court erred in determining the amount of 
damages that Golwix was entitled to receive on its counterclaims 
for breach of warranty and breach of contract. The court only 
awarded a percentage of the actual damages incurred by Golwix in 
replacing the post office air conditioner and for Stacey's breach 
of the agreement to maintain the post office roof. 
I n
 Robbins v. Fanlay, 645 P.2d 623 (Utah 1982), the Utah 
Supreme Court set forth the appropriate measure of damages in 
breach of contract cases: 
The general rule in contract law is that the 
damages recoverable for a breach are those 
which arise naturally from the breach and 
which reasonably may be supposed to have been 
within the contemplation of the parties or 
are reasonably foreseeable. They are 
essentially compensatory in nature. 
Id. at 625; see also Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Greater Park City 
Corp., 592 P.2d 620 (Utah 1979). The focus of the court should 
be on whether the damages are "foreseeable as a natural and 
probable consequence of the breach". Ranch Homes, 592 P.2d at 
624. 
As will be shown below, the Trial Court's award of a 
percentage of the damages attributable to Stacey's breaches of 
the Agreement as to the air conditioner and the post office roof 
failed to fully compensate Golwix for the loss incurred. < 
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Golwix was forced to take reasonable steps to resolve the 
problem. The only evidence presented at trial concerning the 
cost of repair and/or replacement of the air conditioner was 
presented by Golwix. Mr. Bob Banford, an air-conditioning expert 
from the Holbrook Company, testified that the cost of repairing 
the unit to make it operable would have been between $19,000 and 
$20,000. (TR-211.) Because the repair cost nearly equaled the 
replacement cost, Golwix reasonably incurred the expense of 
$22,750 to replace the unit. 
The approach taken by the District Court under 
these facts produces an economically wasteful result. If Golwix 
had repaired the unit at a cost of $20,000, it would have been 
entitled to an award of the full amount. As it turns out, 
however, Golwix was substantially penalized for taking the only 
economical and sensible approach in replacing the worn-out unit. 
This court should not sanction such an illogical result. 
The Trial Court concluded that Golwix v/ould be 
receiving a windfall if the entire amount was awarded and reduced 
the recovery to just 25% of the total cost of the replacement 
unit, stating that "the unit would have had approximately 25% of 
its useful life remaining under normal conditions". (Findings 
and Conclusions l[ lla(3), R-499.) What the useful life of the 
unit would have been under "normal conditions," however, is 
irrelevant. Golwix bargained to have an air-conditioning unit 
that was in working order and operative. The air-conditioning 
unit supplied failed to meet that Agreement. What hypothetically 
may have been the coi 1 d i 1 i < :>i: 1 : > f "l "!| >• »' »""< "!| '»1« "d i > ( '< * 1 \d i 1 i oi is < ::>ther 
than what actually existed simply ha:; ne dppJ i c ^ u o n . 
•;i .i-.^ 'V .:: L!K seller wa^ i i/^^ioi) t.^  •- w t.he 
c o n d i t i o n o f tie.: a i r ' 'on :i '. i o n ^ r a t • i< • i 
t h e ] aw * * I . I M - . ' - V , ••' : n \-• . '"• w : h c e i t a i n t h e a i r 
c ! t i o- • • • ' 1-nce i n d i c a t e d t h a t S t a c e y 
had e x p e n d e d H s u h r . t . j f M d i :,.,. .••- ^ J * - , ^-a v*^ t-^ r e p a i r a 
s i m i l a i i *-obl em on w -MVipnni^e ai r '.^'nii , v )o;u^- l o c a t e ; e ->• 
Ogden p o ; \ : : i c p , f 
condi t ion,*** ^eie r e q u i r e su;):e n
 4t e n r e p a i r s a e i V ° f * , J P : ^^i-i- n t 
was t/heie r ' e - e s e e a ^ l e ana w i t i u i i *• - ''• ^ V ' ^ i t < d t i o n 
Q! ru p a c t , M - - , a : L l - ' i.i.. : '!• v i n n e r ^ d i n t o t \ V J ' - :u • > 
c<>*. t "*h'M • h e r ^ f o r * r ^ u n i n "i ;? ; •- c a ^ e ->. i « - d i r e c t " i o n s ? ) aw :, •' 
( i • f i L J -
w a r r a n * y . 
i )r<!<>*- t e ,? >- -;. * • w 1 -' w» : 4 • ^ r ; * i e* O - r ; 
e n i i w u u \ / D ^ w a ^ e^e * <- (ii;1 . i .< . - > «.
 ( . • » , 
in a r r e d t* i <*pl J ^ I ' • . nr r -u o i u y r ^ n a b 1 . " \ n v i f ^ '* ^ if 
. ; L Lu t i ; ' *" f e r e i i ^ e 
be* N-'-^ .MI i re • f l-'-dit- i r e p a i ; cuoi e . : ^ c o s t P npw 
• "- v*-r e , i s r
 r ( ;> lwix rsr,o-iId h w e b* n -awarded t h e * %><- r ^ 
G o l w i x was E n t i t l e d t o an Award o f Damages t o E n a b l e 
JL ; ! •' i ; - } ° l a * ; : '-1 J^ ' l^^J7^i-9 ^*- R ° ° f • 
Are if: re r imp") r"" -:ie *- a e p ^ e 1 
o f t h e s u b j e c t p r o p e r t i e s was a covcnun* ;J\ s r . s c e y t ^ ma it ; i 
the post office roof in a watertight condition. The Agreement 
provides: 
We will perform all necessary repairs to the 
roof of the Post Office building which are 
reasonably required to maintain a watertight 
roof surface for a period of sixty-seven 
months from the date of closing at our sole 
cost and expense, 
(Findings and Conclusions % 8, R-498.) The language used by the 
parties is clear, Golwix was entitled to expect a watertight 
roof for a period of 67 months. The evidence was overwhelming, 
however, that the roof had leaked incessantly for the 24 months 
prior to trial and that it would continue to do so throughout the 
12 67 month period because the roof had run its useful life. 
The only evidence presented on the cost of 
replacing the roof was by Golwix1 expert. Mr. Kraig Clawson of 
Innovative Roofing Systems testified that a new comparable 15 
year roof would cost approximately $43,750, while a 20 year roof 
would cost $49,000. The District Court concluded that Stacey had 
breached the Agreement to maintain the roof in a watertight 
condition and awarded to Golwix 25% of the cost of a new 20 year 
roof. The District Court's award was erroneous as a matter of 
law and should be reversed for several reasons. 
First, the award put Golwix in a worse position 
than it was in prior to trial. Golwix bargained for the right to 
12. Post Office personnel testified of continuous leaks during 
the prior 24 months. (TR-120-29, 159-60.) Golwix1 roofing 
expert testified that the roof was in such poor condition 
that it could not be repaired to be made watertight short of 
a new roof. (TR-279-80, 284-94, Exhibit D-22.) 
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then multiplied 25% times the cost of a 20 year roof to obtain a 
damage figure. Although Golwix maintains its entitlement to be 
made whole by an award of damages equal to the cost of obtaining 
a watertight roof, the District Court should have used the 
correct comparable roof cost and the appropriate percentage in 
making the calculation that it determined to perform* 
In sum, the District Court failed to award damages 
to Golwix with respect to the air conditioner and the roof to 
fully compensate Golwix for the damages suffered. This court 
should reverse the District Courtfs judgment with respect to such 
damages and remand the case for entry of judgment utilizing the 
correct measure of damages. 
III. GOLWIX ISJHE ONLY PARTY ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The District Court ruled that none of the parties was 
entitled to an award of costs or attorney's fees. Stacey did not 
prevail and cannot prevail on its complaint and is not entitled 
to any award of fees under the terms of the Note. Golwix, on the 
other hand, is entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees 
with respect to the counterclaims on which it prevailed. 
A
* The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that Stacey was not 
Entitled to an Award of Attorney's Fees. 
In its opening brief, Stacey takes the position 
that it is entitled to recover its expenses and fees regardless 
of whether it prevailed on its complaint. That argument is 
totally without merit. The Utah Supreme Court consistently has 
-34- \ 
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Golwix' counterclaims it has enforced that right. The language 
referenced, however, relates to Stacey's right to receive monthly 
payments. If Golwix defaults in making such payments "in the 
time and manner required," Stacey is entitled to accelerate the 
balance owing. Prior to such a default, Stacey has no rights to 
13 
enforce. The Note simply does not provide for an award of 
attorney's fees in defending against counterclaims for breaches 
of the Agreement. 
Stacey1s argument is nothing more than a request 
that this court rewrite the terms of the Agreement to include a 
"prevailing party" attorney's fee provision. A review of the 
Agreement reveals no language granting the right to the 
prevailing party in an action concerning breaches of that 
Agreement to recover attorney's fees. This court has repeatedly 
refused to construe attorney's fee provisions to award fees to a 
prevailing party absent express language setting forth such a 
13. The authorities cited by Stacey state that the proper 
comparison in determining if a percentage of a plaintiff's 
attorney's fees are awardable is "the amount due on 
plaintiff's note less defendant's recovery on the 
counterclaim." Annot. 42 A.L.R.2d 677, 681 (1955). Indeed, 
in Sugar v. Miller, 6 Utah 2d 433, 315 P.2d 862 (Utah 1957), 
cited by Stacey, this court compared the amount due under the 
instrument calling for attorney's fees against the damages 
proven by the defendant. The Sugar court held that "a 
litigant is not entitled to attorney's fees when the adverse 
party has an offset that is greater than the amount due under 
the instrument calling for attorney's fees". 315 P.2d at 
865. In this case, the amount proven by Golwix at trial 
exceeded any amounts due under the Note. Any comparison of 
the amount awarded to Golwix on its counterclaims against the 
total accelerated balance under the Note (as set forth in 
Stacey's opening brief) is therefore meaningless. 
-36- { 
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- Golwix is Entitled toan Award of its Costs and 
Attorney1s Fees Incurred _in Successfully Proving its 
Counterclaims. 
The District Court concluded that Golwix was not 
entitled to an award of attorney's fees because it prevailed on 
some but not all of its counterclaims. Paragraph 17 of the 
Agreement specifically provides that Golwix is entitled to an 
award of its attorney's fees and costs incurred in enforcing its 
14 
rights under the Agreement. 
Golwix incurred substantial costs and attorney's 
fees in proving the counterclaims on which it prevailed. Each of 
those counterclaims arose as a result of Stacey's breaches of the 
covenants and warranties contained in the Agreement and were 
incurred by Golwix in enforcing its rights under the Agreement. 
The fact that Golwix was not successful on all of 
its counterclaims does not defeat its right to recover fees with 
respect to those claims on which it was successful. See Trayner 
v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984). Golwix successfully 
vindicated and enforced its rights with respect to the 
Commonwealth sewer, the Ogden post office air conditioner, and 
the Ogden post office roof. The District Court was in error in 
14. In Paragraph 17 Stacey specifically agreed to indemnify 
Golwix for: "reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses, and 
costs and expenses reasonably incurred, in investigating, 
preparing, or defending against any litigation or claim . . . 
relating or attributable to . . . d. enforcement of your < 
rights under this agreement." 
-38- ( 
failing to award Golwix its costs and attorney's fees in 
successfully enforcing those claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court correctly ruled that there was no 
default under the Note to justify acceleration. The damages 
awarded to Golwix exceeded the cumulative installments due at the 
time of trial. Moreoverf equitable considerations preclude 
acceleration. It would produce an anamalous and inequitable 
result to permit Stacey to accelerate the Note in the face of its 
own breaches of contract and warranty. 
The District Court failed to use the correct measure of 
damages with respect to at least two of the counterclaims proven 
by Golwix. This court should reverse the District Court's 
judgment to that extent and remand with instructions to apply a 
measure of damages which would give Golwix the benefit of its 
bargain and compensate Golwix for its actual loss. 
Finally, Stacey was not entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees since it was unsuccessful in enforcing any of its 
rights under the Note. The District Court erred, however, in 
denying an award of costs and attorney's fees to Golwix with 
respect to the counterclaims proven. Pursuant to the terms of 
the Agreement between the parties, this court should remand the 
issue of attorney's fees to the District Court for a 
determination of the amount of costs and fees expended by Golwix 
in proving its counterclaims. 
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Respectfully submitted this ^)\ day of March, 1987. 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
By; 
Rotyaifl G. Russell 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Counterclaimants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^)V day of 
ue and correct copies of the foregoing were 
? r d March, 1987 
hand-delivered 
Robert M. Anderson, Esq. 
William P. Schwartz, Esq. 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
Valley Tower Building 
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 
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May 1, 1984 
Mr. Ben Wixen 
Ms. Francine A. Wixen 
Dr. Bernie Goler 
Ms. Bonnie Goler 
1911 South Commerce Center. E. 
Suite 211 
San Bernadino. California 92408 
Dear Mr. and Ms. Wixen and Dr. and Ms. Goler: 
This letter is written to set forth the terms of our 
agreement this date relating to the sale by Stacey Properties, 
a Utah Limited Partnership, and me to you as tenants in common. 
1• Property Sold 
The properties to be sold include the following: 
a. Commonwealth Square Shopping Center, Units 
1-18, inclusive. 
b. Pizza Hut, Ogden, Utah. 
c. Eastern Winds Restaurant, Ogden, Utah. 
d. Jiffy Lube Center, Ogden, Utah 
e. Post Office Building, Ogden, Utah. 
All of the said properties are more fully described in 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto. The properties have been 
inspected by you and are purchased "as is". Said buildings 
vary from the plans, specifications and building contracts 
being delivered to you only as set forth on Exhibit B attached 
hereto and in other minor ways which do not materially affect 
the said properties. We agree to remedy any latent defects in 
EXHIBIT MA,f 
Mr. Ben Wixen 
Ms. Francine A. Wixen 
Dr. Bernie Goler 
Ms. Bonnie Goler 
April 20. 1984 
Page 2 
materials or workmanship which arise within a one year period 
from the date of closing. We represent and warrant to you that 
all heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and sewer systems at 
the properties are in working order and will be operative at 
closing and that the footings and foundations are free from 
material structural defects. We further warrant to you that 
the roof at the Eastern Winds and Pizza Hut Restaurants are 
free of any defects in workmanship and material and we warrant 
that we will make any reasonably necessary repairs to said 
roofs required at any time within five years from the date of, 
closing which arise as a direct result of defects in 
workmanship or materials. We further warrant to you that the 
roof at Commonwealth Square is free of any defects in 
workmanship and material and we warrant that we will make any 
reasonably necessary repairs to said roof required at any time 
within one year from the date of closing which arise as a 
direct result of defects in workmanship or materials. We will 
perform all necessary repairs to the roof of the Post Office 
building which are reasonably required to maintain a water 
tight roof surface for a period of sixty seven months from the 
date of closing at our sole cost and expense. 
2. Purchase Price 
The purchase price for all of the foregoing property 
is a total of $3,530,104.95. We will pay sales taxes directly 
attributable to the sale of personal property sold to you 
hereunder. The said purchase price is payable according to the 
following terms and at the times indicated: 
a. $10,000 cash paid this date, to our 
attorneys, Berman & Anderson, to be held in their 
trust account. 
b. The sum of $242,000.00 to be paid at the 
time of closing in cash funds (said amount to be 
increased or reduced for any reduction or increase, 
respectively, in the amount set forth in (e) hereafter 
which occurs prior to closing or for prorations set 
forth in paragraph 4). 
c. The sum of $80,000 evidenced by a promissory 
note payable to Stacey Properties in the form set 
forth in Exhibit "C" attached hereto and by this 
reference made a part hereof. 
Mr. Ben Wixen 
Ms. Francine A. Wixen 
Dr. Bernie Goler 
Ms. Bonnie Goler 
April 20. 1984 
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d. The sum of $2,900,000.00 paid to First 
Security Bank in accordance with the terms of a loan 
transaction set forth in detail in a letter from First 
Security Bank of Utah to each of you dated March 27. 
1984. First Security Bank will require and you agree 
to execute a deed of trust .and promissory note in form 
acceptable to the bank which said documents will be in 
accordance with the terms of your separate agreement 
with the bank dated March 27. 1984. 
e. Assumption of Post Office building mortgage 
in the amount of approximately $298,104.95 to State 
Savings and Loan Association which you will assume and 
agree to pay. 
3. Conveyance 
The properties shall be conveyed, an undivided 
one-half interest to Dr. and Mrs. Goler and an undivided 
one-half interest as part of a Section 1031 exchange 
transaction involving Mr. and Mrs. Wixen and Val Ban Corp., 
each conveyance by a general warranty deed from the Sellers to 
the grantees. 
Mr. and Ms. Wixen shall have the right, without the 
need of any further approval or consent of us prior to the 
completion of the purchase of the subject property to transfer 
and assign all of their rights and obligations under this 
agreement to Val Ban Corp.. a California corporation. 
Val Ban Corp.. pursuant to the contractual obligation 
to purchase the subject property hereunder in accordance with 
the terms and provisions of that certain agreement of exchange 
entered into between Mr. and Ms. Wixen and Val Ban Corp. on 
July 12. 1983. shall complete said purchase according to the 
terms set forth in said agreement. Upon such assignment having 
been made by Mr. and Ms. Wixen and upon our receipt of written 
notice of the same. Mr. and Ms. Wixen shall have no further 
rights, obligations, or liabilities hereunder, all such rights, 
obligations and liabilities having been fully transferred and 
assigned to Val Ban Corp. Upon the conveyance of the undivided 
one-half interest in the properties from Val Ban Corp. to-^ 
Mr. and Ms. Wixen. Val Ban Corp. shall be released by us from 
its obligations under the promissory note (referred to in 
Mr. Ben Wixen 
Ms. Francine A. Wixen 
Dr. Bernie Goler 
Ms. Bonnie Goler 
April 20. 1984 
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paragraph 2(c) above, provided that Mr. and Ms. Wixen assume 
such promissory note obligation. 
4f Prorations and Closing Costs 
The rents, taxes, insurance, and utilities will be 
prorated as of the date of closing and appropriate credits of 
debits made to each of us. Taxes will be prorated on the basis 
of 1983 property taxes with a final adjustment to be made in 
November, 1984, at such time as the exact amount of 1984 taxes 
is known. It is contemplated that you will make similar 
adjustments with First Security Bank of Utah relating to the 
proration of rents. We will pay costs of recording deeds to 
you and the loan fee to First Security Bank in the approximate 
amount of $14,500. We and you will share equally the escrow 
fee. Each of the parties hereto will bear their own attorney's 
fees and costs for preparation of this agreement and in 
connection with the closing. 
5* Leases 
We heretofore delivered to you true, correct and 
complete originals of all tenant leases pertaining to the 
properties being sold to you. Such leases are valid and 
binding documents and are in full force and effect. Except for 
such leases, there are no other agreements in connection with 
leasing of said property between us and such tenants with 
respect to the properties. No party thereunder has any right, 
with the giving of notice or lapse of time or both, to 
terminate any lease or assert any claim thereunder, except as 
set forth in said leases. At the closing, we will by 
instrument satisfactory to you transfer, convey and assign to 
you all of our interest in said leases, including the right to 
receive rents thereunder. Prior to the closing, we will obtain 
for you letters from said tenants confirming the leases, and 
prepaid rents and in addition we will prepare and execute a 
joint letter advising the tenants of the transfer of ownership 
to you and directing such tenants to pay rents to you. Such 
transfer will not constitute a default under any of such 
leases. We will resolve any differences asserted by said 
tenants as it relates to prepaid rents or offsets claimed 
against future rentals becoming due under the terms of the said 
leases, and pay you for the amount of any such difference. 
Prepaid rents and security deposits will be accounted for and 
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paid to you at closing and you will be obligated for such 
deposits in accordance with the terms of said leases. 
6.- Personal Property 
At the time of closing a bill of sale without 
warranties evidencing the sale by us"~to you bf/the equipment 
and persotial property locatfed^at theiBSafftetn Winds Restaurant, 
a completS^list of which is set forth on Exhibit HDM attached 
hereto, will be provided to you relating^to such equipment and, 
personal property.' •'•* " ^ l^ ^ ^ 
' TV-- Preliminary fitIreffepofts ' r 
We have delivered to you this date copies of 
Preliminary Title Reports prepared by Rome Abstract Company 
relating to the properties being sold/ together with copies of 
various documents which are referred to in the said title 
reports. We represent and warrant that, except for those 
matters explicitly described in such Preliminary Title Reports, 
there are no liens, claims or encumbrances existing or which, 
based on facts existing prior to the closing, may be asserted 
against any of the properties. The proposed Section 1031 
exchange transaction will be closed through Home Abstract 
Company. An ALTA Owner's Extended Coverage Title Policy in the 
amount of $3,530,104.9& will be provided to you through Home 
Abstract Company at oux^xpentfeK ^ -"* *r 
8. Allocation of Values 
The allocation of the purchase price of the respective 
properties being sold by us to you will be set forth in a 
Schedule approved by all parties at closing. 
9. Commissions 
We have made arrangements to pay Century 21 Harmston 
Realtors and Wixen Realty, a commission in the total amount of 
$38,000 with Wixen Realty to receive 50\ thereof, in connection 
with the sale and you are not responsible for payment of any 
commission in connection with the subject transaction. 
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10. Warranties 
At closing we will assign to you all contract 
warranties from third parties pertaining to the subject 
properties as they relate to any personal property, the 
structures, or any component parts thereof and we will make a 
reasonable effort to'focate and deliver copies of all documents 
in bur files with respecr ttrereto. *Tft addition, we will 
delTver~to you at closing all original building contracts, 
plans, permits, and other documents pertaining to the 
properties purchased or the construction of same. We have 
advised you most of the properties were constructed without 
written building contracts. -~ 
• ? « • • • 
11. Possession 
Possession of the properties being sold shall be 
delivered at the date of closing. 
12. Closing Date 
The closing date of this transaction and "closing" as 
used herein shall be May 4, 1984, or as said date shall be 
extended by mutual agreement between us. In the event said 
closing does not occur on said date or on the date of extension 
of the closing as mutually agreed to between us, each party 
shall have all remedies provided for by lav. 
13. Representations 
We have previously represented to you and we hereby 
affirm, to the best of our knowledge and belief, that the 
subject properties are in compliance with all applicable 
building rules and regulations, and there are no violations of 
any statutes or judicial orders pertaining to the subject 
properties. The subject properties are in compliance with all 
applicable zoning rules and regulations. There are no judicial 
orders specifically pertaining to the subject properties. We 
have provided you with copies of any special permits or 
conditional use permits relating to operation of the subject 
properties. There are no lawsuits, administrative proceedings, 
arbitrations or other proceedings pertaining to the subject 
properties or affecting such properties and to the best of our 
knowledge none have been threatened and there are no 
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governmental investigations relating thereto. In the event 
suit is filed by any third party to enjoin closing of the 
transaction or to rescind the sale transaction, ve will defend 
said action at our sole cost and expense. 
Stacey Properties is a Utah limited partnership which 
has been duly formed and is validly existing under the laws of 
the State of Utah, and has all powers and authorities and all 
material governmental licenses, authorizations, consents and 
approvals required to carry on the business as now conducted by 
it, to own the properties being sold hereunder, to enter into 
this agreement, to execute and deliver the bill of sale, the 
deeds and the assignments contemplated hereby and to perform 
all of its obligations hereunder and thereunder. J. Ron Stacey 
is the owner of the Commonwealth Square property. The 
execution, delivery and performance by us of this agreement are 
within our power, have been duly authorized by all necessary 
action, require no action by or in respect of, or filing with, 
any partner or any governmental body, agency or official or any 
other party and do not contravene, or constitute a default 
under, any provision of applicable law or regulation or of the 
documents by which we were created and are governed or of any 
agreement, judgment, injunction, order, decree or other 
instrument binding upon us or result in the creation or 
imposition of any lien, charge, encumbrance or security 
interest on any of the properties being sold hereunder. We 
have delivered to you true and complete copies of all of the 
documents by which we were created and are governed which are 
valid and binding and are in full force and effect. We have 
not entered into any contract with any person to manage the 
properties or operate any portion thereof. 
14. Termite Inspection 
At the closing we will provide you with a standard 
inspection certificate indicating no terminate infestation 
issued by a recognized exterminator following inspection of the 
properties sold hereunder. 
15. Survey 
At the closing we will furnish to you surveys prepared 
by a registered surveyor showing the properties being sold and 
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the location of buildings thereon, the location of any streets, 
rights of way, or rights of access. 
16. Conditions 
(i) Your obligation to purchase the properties is 
expressly conditioned upon the following: 
a. That you obtain a loan from First Security 
Bank of Utah in accordance with the terms set forth in 
the letter from First Security to you dated March 27, 
1984, or as said loan is amended or altered by mutual 
agreement between you and the bank; 
b. That all representations and warranties made 
by us shall be true and correct on and as of the date 
of closing as if made on such date; 
c. That we shall have fully performed and 
complied with all of the obligations to be performed 
by us in this agreement; 
d. That you shall have received an opinion from 
our attorneys, Berman & Anderson, in the form set 
forth on Exhibit "E" hereto; 
e. That the assumption of the Post Office 
building mortgage has been approved by State Savings 
and Loan Association and the interest rate thereon 
shall not exceed 11 1/2% per annum; and 
f• That there shall have been no material 
adverse change in any of the properties or title 
thereto since April 1. 1984. 
(ii) Our obligation to sell the properties 
is expressly conditioned upon the following: 
(a) That First Security Bank release us from all of 
our obligations and liabilities to said Bank; 
(b) That you shall have fully performed and complied 
with all of the obligations to be performed by you in this 
agreement; 
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(c) That J. Ron Stacey and Geraldine Stacey shall be 
released from any liability to State Savings and Loan 
Association arising in connection with the Post Office mortgage 
being assumed by you. 
17. Indemnity 
He agree to indemnify, defend and hold you harmless 
and reimburse you on demand from and against, for, and with 
respect to any claim, liability, obligation, loss, damage, 
deficiency, assessment, judgment, cost or expense (including 
without limitation reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses, and 
costs and expenses reasonably incurred, in investigating, 
preparing or defending against any litigation or claim), 
action, suit, proceeding or demand, of any kind or character, 
arising out of or in any manner incident, relating or 
attributable to: 
a. any breach or failure of any representation 
or warranty given by us contained in this agreement or 
in any certificate, instrument, assignment, conveyance 
or transfer, or other document or agreement executed 
by either of us in connection with this agreement; 
b. any failure of either of us to perform or 
observe, or to have performed or observed, in full, 
any covenant, agreement, or condition to be performed 
or observed by us under this agreement or under any 
certificate or other instrument, document or agreement 
executed by us in connection with this agreement; 
c. the assertion by any person of any claim, 
liability, obligation, agreement or undertaking which 
relates to the properties or which in any manner 
affects title to the properties which arises out of 
any facts, transactions or circumstances occurring on 
or prior to the closing date; or 
d. the enforcement of your rights under this 
agreement. 
18. Survival. 
The representations, warranties and covenants given by 
us contained herein and the certificates delivered at the 
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closing or otherwise delivered pursuant to this agreement, 
shall survive the closing without regard to any investigation 
made by you. 
19. Waiver and Modification. 
This agreement may not be amended, modified, 
superseded or cancelled, and none of the terms, covenants, 
representations, warranties or conditions, may be waived except 
by written instrument executed by all of us and for. or. in the 
case of a waiver, by the party waiving compliance. Failure of 
any party at any time or times to require strict performance of 
any provision hereof shall not in any manner affect the right 
of such party at a later date to enforce the same. No waiver 
by any party of the breach of any term, covenant, 
representation or warranty contained in this agreement as a 
condition to such party's obligations hereunder, shall 
constitute a release or affect any liability resulting from 
said breach. 
20, Successors in Interest; Assignment. 
This agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the 
benefit of the successors and assigns of the parties. Except 
as provided herein, no assignment of any rights and delegations 
of any obligations for which provision is made in this 
agreement may be made by any party without the prior written 
consent of the other party. 
If the foregoing sets forth the terms of our 
understanding, please execute this agreement where set forth 
below. 
Very truly yours. 
STACBY 
Mr. Ben Wixen 
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Ms. Bonnie Goler 
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Accepted and agreed to this 
ZlLday Pf Aprils 1984. 
Bernie Goler 
Idnwvct Jb&j 
Bonnie Goler 
^L 
4066a 
050184 
Clark Waddoups, Esq., #A3975 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq., IA4134 
LARSEN, KIMBALL, PARR 4 CROCKETT 
Attorneys for .Defendants and Counterclaimants 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
STACEY PROPERTIES, a Utah 
limited partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEN WIXEN, FRANCINE WIXEN, 
BERNIE GOLER AND BONNIE GOLER, 
Defendants and 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
J. RON STACEY, 
Counterclaim ; 
Defendant. 
1 . FINDINGS OF PACT AND 
' CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 90743 
This matter, having been tried to the Court on May 28, 
29, and 30, 1986, and pla int i f f and J. Ron Stacey having been 
represented by Robert M. Anderson and William p. Schwartz, and 
defendants having been represented by Clark Waddoups and Ronald 
G. Russell , and the Court, having heard the evidence and argument 
of counsel, hereby makes the following findings and conclusions: 
EXHIBIT "B" 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. * On May 22, 1984, plaintiff Stacey Properties, 
counterclaim defendant J. Ron Stacey, and defendants Ben Wixen, 
Francine Wixen, Bernie Goler, and Bonnie Goler entered into a 
written agreement (the "Agreement") whereby certain properties 
were sold by plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey to defendants, including 
the main Ogden post office located in Ogden, Utah, and the 
Commonwealth Square Shopping Center located in Sunset, Otah. 
2* As partial payment for the properties, defendants 
executed an $80,000 promissory note dated May 22, 1984, payable 
to plaintiff in monthly installments of $731.79, beginning on 
June 1, 1984 (the "Note"). 
3» Defendants paid to plaintiff $744.60 on August 1, 
1984; and $731.79 on August 29, 1984. 
4#' The Note contains a provision concerning offsets 
which states: 
Contemporaneous with Makers1 execution of 
this Note, Makers, Properties and J. Ron Stacey 
("Stacey") have executed a letter agreement 
relating to the sale and purchase of certain 
parcels of realty located in Davis and Weber 
Counties, State of Utah. Pursuant to Section 17 
of said letter agreement, Properties and Stacey 
agree to indemnify, defend, and hold Makers 
harmless and to reimburse Makers on demand from 
and against, for, and with respect to inter alia, 
any claim, liability or obligation relating ro 
attributable to any breach of failure of any 
representation or warranty given by Properties 
and Stacey contained in the letter agreement 
or any failure of either of 
-2-
them to perform any covenant to be performed 
under such agreement or any such instrument. 
Makers shall have the right to offset against 
any amounts due or to become due to 
Properties under this Note any such 
reimbursement due to Makers under Section 17 
of said letter agreement or under any other 
provision thereof . . ., provided, however, 
that Makers give Properties written notice of 
the amount to be offset and the specific 
reasons therefor. 
• .,- 5. On September 5, 1984, defendants sent written 
notice to plaintiff asserting an offset against amounts due or to 
become due under the Note for expenses incurred by defendants in 
replacing an air-conditioning unit at the Ogden post office. The 
amount and specific reasons for the offset were stated in that 
letter. 
6. Defendants did not make the September, 1984 
monthly payment under the Note and made no payments under the 
Note after claiming said offset. As of May 1, 1986, the total of 
unpaid installments under the Note was $16,099.38. 
7. Plaintiff sent a letter to defendants on September 
12, 1984 asserting that it was accelerating the entire balance 
due and owing under the Note and further asserting that 
defendants had failed to make payments in th* time and manner 
required by the Note. The Note provides: 
In the event this Note, or any obligation 
provided to be satisfied or performed under 
any agreement, instrument or document 
connected with or related to this Note, now 
existing or otherwise, is breached or is not 
satisfied, performed or paid, at the time and 
in the manner required, Properties, at its 
option and without notice, may declare the 
unpaid principal balance and accrued interest 
immediately due and payable and makers agree 
to immediately pay the same. 
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8. The Agreement provides: 
[Stacey Properties and J. Ron Stacey] agree 
to remedy any latent defects in materials or 
worHcmanship which arise within a one year 
period from the date of closing. We 
represent and warrant to you that all 
heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and 
sewer systems at the properties are in 
working order and will be operative at 
closing We will perfora all necessary 
repairs to the roof of the Ogden post office 
building which are reasonably required to 
maintain a watertight roof surface for a 
period of sixty-seven mpnths from the date of 
closing at our sole cost and expense. 
9. At trial, defendants claimed offsets against the 
Note for the following items and amounts: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
Ogden Post Office Air 
Conditioner Replacement 
Commonwealth Sewer Repair 
Ogden Post Office Roof 
Commonwealth Sidewalk Repair 
Commonwealth Electrical Repair 
Property Tax Adjustment 
Commonwealth Pire Sprinkler 
$25,063, 
$ 1,037, 
$43,750, 
$ 7,600, 
$ 1,409. 
$ 3,028. 
$ 1,190. 
.80 
.83 
.00 
.00 
.70 
.52 
.00 
10. Defendants provided plaintiff with written notice 
of each claimed offset, which notice stated the amounts claimed 
and reasons therefor. 
11. According to the evidence presented, the Court1s 
findings regarding the offsets claimed by defendants are as 
follows: 
a. Post Office Air-Conditioning Unit. 
(1) The air-conditioning unit, according 
* to the circumstantial evidence presented, was 
not in working order and was not operative on 
May 22, 1984; 
(2) The air-conditioning unit had an 
expected useful life of approximately fifteen 
years; 
(3) On May 22, 1984, the unit would have 
had approximately 25% of its useful life 
remaining under normal conditions; 
(4) Plaintiff was notified by Eugene 
Perren of the post office by at least May 29, 
1984 that the air-conditioning unit was not 
operable* Plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey failed 
to make repairs to the unit after receiving 
notice from the post office that the unit was 
inoperable; 
(5) Defendants incurred a total expense 
of $22,758*00 to replace the air-conditioning 
unit, the first installment of which in the 
amount of $6,000 was paid on August 21, 1984* 
b. Commonwealth Square Sewer System* 
(1) Defendants discovered a 16"-18" gap 
in a sewer pipe at Commonwealth Square within 
one year of May 22, 1984, which gap was never 
remedied by plaintiff or J. Ron Stacey. 
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(2) The subject gap was not discovered 
prior to closing and could not have been 
discovered by a reasonable inspection due to 
its nature and location; 
(3) Defendants incurred an expense of 
$1,037.83 to repair said gap. 
c. Ogden Post Office Roof. 
(1) The Ogden .post office roof has 
leaked on numerous occasions following 
closing and plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey have 
failed to perform all necessary repairs which 
were reasonably required to maintain a 
watertight roof surface; 
(2) According to the evidence presented 
by defendants, the cost of replacing the post 
office roof with a new "twenty year" roof 
would be $49,000; 
(3) The age of the roof at the date of 
closing was approximately twelve years; 
(4) Defendants have not incurred any 
out-of-pocket expenses to repair said roof as 
of the time of trial. 
d. Commonwealth Square Sidewalk. 
(1) The sidewalks at Commonwealth Square 
are currently in a defective condition in 
several places; 
-6-
(2) The defects were discoverable by 
defendants prior to May 22, 1984; 
#
 e. Commonwealth Electrical System. 
(1) Defendants failed to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that the 
Commonwealth electrical system was not in 
working order at the date of closing. 
f. Property Tax Adjustment. 
(1) Defendants failed to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that plaintiff owed 
defendants additional amounts pursuant to the 
parties* agreement to adjust the property 
taxes payable by the parties according to the 
actual 1984 tax assessment. 
(2) Plaintiff moved at the start of 
trial to amend its Complaint to include a 
claim for the property tax proration owed 
plaintiff by defendants, which motion was 
granted. 
(3) Defendants have failed to make 
payment to plaintiff of $958.10 for which the 
tenants at Commonwealth were responsible and 
for which plaintiff claimed a pro-rata 
credit. 
g. Commonwealth Fire Sprinkling System. 
(1) Defendants failed to present any 
evidence that the fire sprinkling system at 
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Commonwealth Square was not in working order 
at the date of closing. 
12. • These Findings of Fact shall be construed to be 
Conclusions of Law to the extent that same may be found to 
constitute Conclusions of Law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
13. The Court makes the following conclusions with 
respect to each of the claimed offsets: 
a #
 Post Office Air-Conditioning Unit. 
(1) The east air-conditioning unit at 
the Ogden post office was not in working 
order and operative on May 22, 1984 in breach 
of the terms of the Agreement; 
(2) Defendants would receive a windfall 
if plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey were held 
responsible for the entire cost of 
replacement; 
(3) Defendants are entitled to offset 
against amounts due or to become due under 
the Note the amount of $5,689.50, which is 
25% of the total replacement cost of the air 
conditioner incurred by defendants, together 
with prejudgment interest on that amount at 
12% per annum from August 21, 1984 to May 30, 
1986 or $1,209.89. 
-8-
b. Commonwealth Sewer System. 
(1) A latent defect in the sewer system 
at Commonwealth Square Shopping Center arose 
within one year from May 22, 1984, which 
defect plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey failed to 
remedy in breach of the teras of the 
Agreement* 
(2) Defendants.are entitled to offset 
against amounts due or to become due under 
the Note the amount of $1,037.83 for costs 
incurred by defendants to repair said sewer 
system, together with pre-judgment interest 
on that amount from January 1, 1985 to May 
30, 1986 or $175.72. 
c. Ogden Post Office Roof• 
(1) Plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey have 
failed to perform all necessary repairs which 
were reasonably required to maintain the 
Ogden post office roof in a watertight 
condition in breach of the terms of the 
Agreement; 
(2) Defendants would receive a windfall 
if plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey were held 
responsible for the entire cost of a new 
roof; 
(3) Defendants are entitled to recover 
against plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey an award 
-9-
of damages proximately resulting from said breach 
in "the amount of $12,250, which is 25% of the 
cost of a new "twenty-year" roof; 
(4) Because defendants had incurred no 
out-of-pocket expenses with respect to said roof 
prior to trial, no offset against the Note arose 
under Paragraph 17 of the Agreement and the Note, 
(5) Plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey shall have no 
further obligations under the Agreement with , 
respect to the Ogden post office roof from and 
after May 30, 1986. 
d. Commonwealth Square Sidewalk. 
(1) The defects claimed by defendants with 
respect to the Commonwealth Square Shopping 
Center were not latent defects within the terms 
of the agreement; 
(2) Defendants are not entitled to any award 
with respect to said sidewalks. 
e. Commonwealth Electrical System. 
(1) The defendants have failed to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that the Commonwealth 
electrical system was not in working order on Nay 
22, 1984. 
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(2) Defendants are not entitled to any 
award with respect to said electrical system. 
f# Property Tax Adjustment. 
(1) Pursuant to the Agreement, plaintiff 
and J. Ron Stacey are entitled to recover 
$958.10 from defendants jointly and 
severally, together with prejudgment interest 
at the rate of 12% per annum from January 1, 
1985 to May 30, 1986 in the amount of 
$162.22, as a pro-rata credit for property 
taxes which were paid or should have been 
paid to defendants by certain tenants. 
(2) Defendants are not entitled to any 
award with respect to property taxes. 
g. Commonwealth Fire Sprinkling System. 
(1) Defendants presented no evidence 
that the Commonwealth fire sprinkling system 
was not in working order at the date of 
closing. 
(2) Defendants are not entitled to any 
award with respect to said system. 
14. The time at which a default justifying 
acceleration is measured is at the time of the attempted 
acceleration. No default had occurred on September 12, 1984 
justifying acceleration and the attempted acceleration by 
plaintiff was of no effect. 
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15* Plaintiff was not entitled to accelerate the Note 
at the time the complaint was filed because the payments made by 
the defendants* to replace the subject air conditioner exceeded 
amounts due under the Note on that date. 
16. Acceleration is a harsh remedy and the plaintiff 
is not entitled to acceleration as of the date of trial for the 
additional reason that acceleration should not be dependent upon 
the uncertainties of delays in bringing a case to trial. 
17. Because defendants are entitled to a money 
judgment with respect to damages awarded for breach of the 
agreement to maintain the post office roof, acceleration of the 
Note at this time would be inappropriate. 
18. The total amount awarded to defendants, including 
prejudgment interest, is to be offset against the cumulative 
monthly installments under the Note of $16,099.38 (as of May 1, 
1986) and against future installments under the Note until such 
amount has been fully satisfied. 
19. Pursuant to stipulation, defendants1 Fourth 
Counterclaim shall be dismissed with prejudice. 
20. Plaintiff did not prevail on its complaint for 
acceleration and is therefore not entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees. 
21. The defendants would be entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees if they had simply defended the case 
successfully, but are not entitled to an award of fees because 
they did not prevail on many of their counterclaims. 
22. All parties shall bear their own costs. 
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23. These Conclusions of Law shall be construed to be 
Findings of Fact to the extent that the same may be found to 
constitute FinSings of Fact* ^s-y^^^.. 
DATED this /*> day of ^ August, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ 
\Wage David E. Roth 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Robert M. Anderson of 
Hansen and Anderson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and J_, Ron Stacey 
Rofra^ a G. RuCTeipoi 
Lar/en, Kimball, Parr & Crockett 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Counterclaimaints 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of August 1986, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand-delivered to: 
Robert M. Anderson, Esq, 
William P. Schwartz, Esq. 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
Valley Tower Building 
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
-i A -
May 25, -1984 
The Undersign hereby agrees to be liable as co-makers of that certain Promisory 
Note, as said Note as been modified by interlineations and additions previously 
agreed to by Val Ban Corp., Bernie and Bonnie Goler. 
A photo copy of said Note ( reflecting such modification is attached hereto as 
Ehlbit "A". 
jLt*<^W *^f£j 
Francine A. Wlxen 
EXHIBIT "C 
f 
EXHIBIT "A" 
PROMISSORY NOTE 
$80,000.00 Salt Lake City, Utah 
May 2Jr 1984 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned ("Makers") promise 
to pay to the order of STACEY PROPERTIES, a Utah limited 
partnership ("Properties"), or its assigns, the principal sura of 
Eighty Thousand Dollars ($80,000.00), together with interest on 
said principal sum, or the unpaid balance thereof, from and after 
the date hereof, at the rate of ten and one-half percent (10 
1/22) per annum. Principal and interest shall be paid in monthly 
installments of $731.79 each, payable on the first day of each 
month commencing June 1, 1984. Payments shall be applied first 
to accrued interest with the remainder applied to principal. The 
entire principal balance.and all accrued interest shall be due 
and payable on the 1st day of May, 1994. 
Contemporaneous with Makers1 execution of this Note, 
Makers, Properties and J. Ron Stacey ("Stacey") have executed a 
letter agreement relating to the sale and purchase of certain 
parcels of realty located in Davis and Weber Counties, State of 
Utah. Pursuant to Section 17 of said letter agreement, 
Properties and Stacey agree to indemnify, defend and hold Makers 
harmless and to reimburse Makers on demand* from and against, for, 
and with respect to, inter alia, any claim, liability or 
obligation relating or attributable to any breach or failure of 
any representation or warranty given by Properties and Stacey 
contained in the letter agreement or any instrument executed by 
either of them in connection therewith or any failure of either 
of them to perform any covenant to be performed under such 
agreement or any such instrument. Makers shall have the right to 
offset against any amounts due or to become due to Properties 
under this Note any such reimbursement due to Makers under 
Section 17 of said letter agreement or under any other provision 
thereof or of any document executed in conjunction therewith, 
provided, however, that Makers give Properties written notice of 
the amount to be offset and the specific reasons therefor. 
In the event this Note, or any obligation provided to 
be satisfied or performed under any agreement, instrument or 
document connected with or related to this Note, now existing or 
otherwise, is breached or is not satisfied, performed or paid, at 
the time and in the manner required, Properties, at its option 
and without xtotice, may declare the unpaid principal balance and 
accrued interest immediately due. and payable and Makers agree to 
immediately pay the same. Makers agree to pay any and all costs 
and expenses (regardless of the particular nature thereof and 
Hafjgcc^ Centex fe-florants far £&& <*w^%»{> . * ; 
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_„ jor ^ without suit or bafora or'lfter 
uagaent, ^Including 'reasonable' attorney a* ifees) which "aay fee 
curred by or in connact ion "with the enforcement or parformanca '"•£. ' ;:v• 
cf any of the^righta of Properties haraundar or undar any -?•/••.-'-'.'. 
agfeeaent,'instrument or document connected with or related to "-.-. 
i-this Note. If principal or intarest owing hereunder are not paid 
r:vhen due, 'interest shall thereafter accrue on tha unpaid 
-principal balance at the rata of eighteen percent (18Z) per 
rannua, both before and after Judgaent. The entire balance of 
-.principal and interest owing hereunder, shall mature and be 
payabla in tha avent of sala or transfer by Makers of all or any . 
portion of tha Coaaonwaalth Square Shopping Canter located in AIK/J/, 
Sunset, Utah ("the Center"), provided, however, that (\)*ktid /)L%tK 
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;/rt/jtfof/fifift#et (2) tha transfer of a l l or any portion of tha 
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- contro l l ed by Makers or any ona of thaa or a l i n e a l descendant W 
' sttc^tr^r/of Makers or any ona of then, or* (3) the transfer to a 
spouse,oziineal descendant ui eiiuoslur of a Maker or to a t rus t 
naaing a Maker or a spouse pr l lnea l descendant tftf/WWtlfitf of a 
as a beneficiary/"shall not ba deeaed to accelerate the 
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percent ftflS) of tha capital of a partnership or unincorporated /)A//A 
entity or xne ownership of nore than fifty percent (AMT») of all y{Jls(A} 
classes of stock of a corporation. anettunSred 1001 ^ 
Presentment for payment, protest and notice of protest 
ar.-i of non-payment of this Note ara hereby waived. 
In the event Properties determines that it will sell or 
discount this Note, and if Makers ara not then in default 
hereunder, then Properties shall offer tha right to Makers to 
purchase this Note on the same terms set forth in said offer. 
This Note is executed in connection with and pursuant 
to tha terms of tha letter agreeaant above-mentioned and certain 
other written agreements entered into between Makers, Properties 
and Staeey, and tha terms thereof ara hereby incorporated into 
and by reference Bade a part of this Hota* 
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that Makers shall pay Properties $10,000??T/ Si/tZ&t*' 
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whether incurred with or without suit or before or after 
judgment, including reasonable attorneys1 fees) which may be 
incurred by or in connection with the enforcement or performance 
of any of the rights of Properties hereunder or under any 
agreement, instrument or document connected with or related to 
this Note. If principal or interest owing hereunder are not paid 
when due, interest shall thereafter accrue on the unpaid 
principal balance at the rate of eighteen percent (182) per 
annum, both before and after judgment. The entire balance of 
principal and interest owing hereunder shall mature and be 
.payable in the event of sale or transfer by Makers of all or any 
portion of the Commonwealth Square Shopping Center located in ) 
Sunset, Utah (,fthe Center"), provided, however, that (l)*fel*e
 ;>V 
tgansfeg ef leasehold interests by Mahegs of all eg any pegfcien ' 
of the Center, (2) the transfer of all or any portion of the 
Center to a corporation, partnership or other entity which is, j 
controlled by Makers or any one of them or a lineal descendant +r p ^ 
anoasteg of Makers or any one of them, •# (3) the transfer to a fifj 
spouse?^ lineal descendant eg eneestear of a Maker or to a trust 
naming a Maker or a spous%zJ lineal descendant er anooster of a 
Maker as a beneficiary**shall not be deemed to accelerate the 
maturity date for payment of principal and interest owing /^* 
hereunder. The term "control" means ownership of more than fiffcyone hund 
percent (•f9S-;18"the capital of a partnership or unincorporated 
entity or the ownership of more than/fifty percent (£99) of all 2*f-" 
classes of stock of a corporation, one hundred 100% (j 
Presentment for payment, protest and notice of protest 
and of non-payment of this Note are hereby waived. 
In the event Properties determines that it will sell or 
discount this Note, and if Makers are not then in default 
hereunder, then Properties shall offer the right to Makers to 
purchase this Note on the same terms set forth in said offer. 
This Note is executed in connection with and pursuant 
to the terms of the letter agreement above-mentioned and certain 
other written agreements entered into between Makers, Properties 
and Stacey, and the terms thereof are hereby incorporated into 
and by reference made a part of this Note. 
VAL BAN CORP., a California 
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) **the sale or transfer by Makers of Unit 18 in the Center (provided, 
^ifa however, that Makers shall pay Properties $10,000.00 at the closin 
v /) of such sale if, but only if/the price for such Unit 18 equals or 
exceeds $120.000.00)* 
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Clark Waddoups, Esq., #A3975 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq., IA4134 
LARSEN, KIMBALL, PARR * CROCKETT 
Attorneys for pefendants and Counterclaimants 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
STACEY PROPERTIES, a Utah 
limited partnership. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEN WIXEN, FRANCINE WIXEN, 
BERNIE GOLER AND BONNIE GOLER, 
Defendants and 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. i 
J. RON STACEY, 
Counterclaim ] 
Defendant. j 
• JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 90743 
This matter having been tried to the Court on Nay 28, 
29, and 30, 1986, the Honorable David Roth presiding, and 
Findings of Pact and Conclusion of Lav having been duly entered, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That plaintiff Stacey Properties and J. Ron Stacey 
do recover from defendants and counterclaimants Ben Wixen, 
Francine Wixen, Bernie Goler, and Bonnie Goler, the total sum of 
$1,120.32, which sum includes prejudgment interest accrued prior 
EXHIBIT "D" 
to May 30, 1986, together with interest thereon at the rate of 
12% per annum from May 30, 1986 until paid; 
2. *That said defendants and counterclaimants do 
recover on their counterclaims from Stacey Properties and J. Ron 
Stacey the total sum of $20,362.94, which sum includes 
prejudgment interest accrued prior to May 30, 1986, together with 
interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from May 30, 1986 
until paid; 
3. That the foregoing amount awarded to defendants and 
counterclaimants is hereby ordered offset against the cumulative 
monthly installments of $16,099.38 which are due as of May 1, 
1986 under that certain Promissory Note dated May 22, 1984 and 
payable to plaintiff (the "Note") and the remainder of such award 
is to be offset against future installments under the Note until 
such amount has been fully satisfied; 
4. That plaintiff's claim herein for acceleration of 
the Note is dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action; 
5. That plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey are released from 
any further obligation to maintain or repair the Ogden post 
office roof from and after May 30, 1986; 
6. That defendants1 and counterclaimants1 Fourth 
Counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action; and 
7. That none of the parties are awarded attorney's 
fees and all parties shall bear their own, costs. 
/ < - < ^ s * S r 
DATED t h i s /J day of Jfofruofe, 1986. 
7$r 
ywuagfcDavxd E. Roth 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Robert M. Anderson of 
Hansen and Anderson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and J. Ron Stacey 
CERTIFICATE_0FSERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of August, 1986, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT was 
hand-delivered to: 
Robert M. Anderson, Esq. 
William P. Schwartz, Esq. 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
Valley Tower Building 
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
